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REMOTE SENSING OF PRIVATE DATA BY DRONES IS 
MOSTLY UNREGULATED: REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 
OF PRIVACY ARE AT RISK ABSENT COMPREHENSIVE 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
JOSEPH J. VACEK, J.D., CFI* 
ABSTRACT 
The current regulatory structure governing the use of small drones by 
government and citizens is not yet fully settled, but enough parameters exist 
in the form of existing and proposed regulations, statutes, and case law that 
the answer to the question of whether police and private citizens may use 
small drones to remotely sense or record other people’s activities is 
generally yes, subject to a few limitations.  The next set of questions that 
arise pertain to the methods of collection, use, retention, and dissemination 
of that remotely sensed data.  The current legal landscape in the United 
States relevant to that set of questions includes common law principles 
based in tort, the Third-Party Doctrine, federal data protection statutes such 
as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Privacy Act, 
Unmanned Aircraft System-specific laws, policies and regulations such as 
the 2012 FAA Reauthorization Act, the newly proposed Federal Aviation 
Regulations for small UAS, and a Presidential Memorandum on privacy 
issues related to drone use.  Those laws, regulations, and policies, both 
individually and together, are ineffective in protecting remotely sensed 
private data.  Because states are federally preempted from regulating 
aviation, a comprehensive federal legislative enactment delineating specific 
limitations on the gathering of private data via drones is necessary to 
prevent erosion of our collective reasonable expectations of privacy. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The flight of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“UAS”), or Drones, in the 
national airspace has become an ordinary, unremarkable event.  Neither the 
technology for remotely controlled or even autonomous flight nor the 
aerodynamics of fixed wing or helicopter-type drones are new, having been 
developed and operational in various forms since World War II.  Since that 
time, a cottage industry of remote-controlled aircraft enthusiasts and 
hobbyists has existed, mostly for the pleasure of constructing and flying 
scale-model aircraft at local parks.  Remote sensing technology in the 
United States developed along a similar timeline, with World War II and 
the Cold War prompting research and development of relatively lightweight 
and small airborne cameras and sensing equipment, which also spurred 
development of a cottage industry of amateur photo and video enthusiasts. 
Together, these ingredients now provide cheap airborne imaging 
equipment available to the general public in the United States.  Currently, 
amateur civilian drone operators may remotely sense persons and property 
practically without limitation.  Commercial drone operators have obtained 
special permission and are eagerly awaiting the publication of proposed 
rules allowing widespread use of drones for remote sensing.  And existing 
precedent allows warrantless airborne remote sensing by police of private 
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areas in open view from a legal altitude1 using technology in general public 
use2 as long as the remote sensing does not penetrate into a home.3  The 
common law and the proposed rules will likely follow suit, and operating a 
drone to photograph people from above in a manner that complies with 
applicable federal aviation regulations will probably not give rise to a civil 
suit for invasion of privacy or trespass.  Operation of the drone itself is only 
the first step, however.  The remote sensing, use, and storage of the data are 
all open questions under current laws, and protection of that data is 
problematic because of a fragmentary legal structure. 
This article will examine in detail the existing legal structure governing 
airborne remote sensing by drone in three sections.  First, it will canvas 
applicable principles of common law and existing federal regulations and 
statutes.  Second, it will explore constitutional issues pertinent to 
government and police remote sensing using drones.  Third, it will move to 
an analysis of current civil use and misuse of drones by the general public.  
It concludes by arguing that the existing data protection laws in the United 
States are wholly inadequate to protect citizens’ remotely sensed data from 
unauthorized government or private use.  In combination with the 
widespread availability of small, inexpensive, and automated drones and the 
widely acknowledged inability of the Federal Aviation Administration 
(“FAA”) to enforce its rules, the implication is that the citizens have 
nullified the existing rules and laws, such that a significant reduction in 
subjective and objective reasonable expectations of privacy is inevitable. 
II. LAWS REGULATING REMOTE SENSING BY DRONES 
The various laws regulating remote sensing by drones developed 
independently in two different areas of law.  The first area is under the 
framework of tort law, from which the general right of privacy developed in 
the common law.  The second area is under international treaty. 
Specifically, Article 8 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation 
from 1944 (the Chicago Treaty) stipulates that “[n]o aircraft capable of 
being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a pilot over the territory 
of a contracting state without special authorization by that state and in 
accordance with the terms of such authorization . . . .”4 
 
1  See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 
(1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).  
2  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001). 
3  Joseph J. Vacek, Big Brother Will Soon Be Watching—Or Will He?, 85 N.D. L. REV. 673, 
680 (2009). 
4.  Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 
U.N.T.S. 295. 
           
2014] REMOTE SENSING OF PRIVATE DATA BY DRONES 467 
Tort law has traditionally defined the right of privacy as the right of a 
person to be free from intrusion upon seclusion, from being shown in a 
false light, from private information being publicly disclosed, and from 
misappropriation of his or her likeness.5  Of course, a person may elect to 
disclose ordinarily personal or private things in a public forum, such as by 
posting a revealing Facebook status update or by uploading a compromising 
photo on Flickr or Pinterest.  This behavior is a license for public 
observation and analogous to the principle that a bell cannot be unrung.  
Such actions led to the development of the Third-Party Doctrine, which will 
be explored further later.  Overall, though, the common law does not keep 
pace with technological developments as evidenced by legislators filling 
gaps with statutory law.  But the sensing of private data by drone is a 
unique case that allows access around many of the barriers erected by the 
common law and statutory protections, which thus requires singular 
consideration. 
A. FEW LEGAL PRINCIPLES PROTECT REMOTELY SENSED PRIVATE 
DATA 
The legal right to keep certain things private has been imported by the 
English common law in cases dating back to the early 1800s,6 specifically 
for issues concerning intellectual property7 and photographic images.8  
American common law has also adopted these principles with the 
development of tort law in the areas of nuisance, invasion of privacy, and 
trespass, especially.  “The common law secures to each individual the right 
of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and 
emotions shall be communicated to others.”9  And that right, in all cases, 
belongs solely to the individual in terms of whether or how to grant it to the 
public.10  The justification for that right, however, has traditionally been 
illustrated using the physical process of letter writing and the securing of 
that single copy of the letter in a locked desk or sealed in an envelope and 
placed in the mail for delivery.  The utility of that analogy arguably has 
ended with the advent of electronic communications, practically infinite 
storage and retrieval capability, and airborne remote sensors mounted on 
 
5.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
6.  See, e.g., Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L.J. Ch. 209 (1825). 
7.  Id. 
8.  Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888). 
9.  Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198 
(1890). 
10.  Id. 
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drones.  So torts grounded in that theory have only tenuous applicability to 
privacy invasions or remote sensing via drone. 
1. Common Law Principles of Nuisance, Trespass, and Invasion 
of Privacy Give Limited Protection from Airborne Remote 
Sensing 
Common law recognizes several actions in tort that are designed to 
allow an individual to maintain a privacy wall—literal and metaphorical—
between what he or she wishes to keep private and others whose curiosity 
compels them to snoop.  However, physical walls or written letters sealed in 
paper envelopes bear little relevance to data collection by drone.  The three 
classic tort actions relevant to airborne snooping are the torts of nuisance, 
trespass, and invasion of privacy.  Nuisance is the oldest and broadest of the 
three and developed in accordance with the legal theory that not only should 
injuries to the person be compensable, but also injuries to a person’s 
property.11  The law of nuisance produced the concept of zoning as a 
preemptive rule to avoid continuous litigation, and the current system of 
airspace classification in the United States follows similar principles of 
“zoning” where certain kinds of operations are prohibited in certain classes 
of airspace.  But aside from that nice analogy, the law of nuisance has been 
described as an “impenetrable jungle . . . [meaning] all things to all people, 
and has been applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming 
advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie.  There is general agreement 
that it is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition.”12 
Unfortunately, then, in the context of drone operations, there probably 
exists a set of facts that, when applied creatively to the theory of nuisance, 
may give rise to injunction or damages against the drone operator.  But the 
way there is not clear. 
Trespass, the second classic tort relevant to drone operations, is much 
more clearly defined in the common law and is bifurcated into trespass to 
land and trespass to chattels.  Trespass to land is defined as a “wrongful 
interference with another’s possessory rights in real property.”13  Possessory 
rights in real property extend upwards into the airspace to the highest level 
the possessor can reasonably use14—providing a potential cause of action 
 
11.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
12.  WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 86, 616 (5th ed. 
1984). 
13.  See, e.g., Robert’s River Rides, Inc. v. Steamboat Dev. Corp., 520 N.W.2d 294, 301 
(Iowa 1994). 
14.  See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946) (“It is ancient doctrine that at 
common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the universe—Cujus est solum 
ejus est usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has no place in the modern world.”). 
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against drone operators intruding into superadjacent airspace above a 
plaintiff’s land.  Much remote sensing equipment is powerful enough, 
though, to allow an airborne snoop to fly above such superadjacent airspace 
and avoid a trespass claim. 
The other trespass action—trespass to chattels—may possibly provide 
limited relief.  Trespass to chattels has been defined as “an intentional 
interference with the possession of personal property . . . proximately 
caus[ing] injury.”15  If the drone operator remotely senses something that 
could be objectively defined as personal property, a cause of action may 
arise.  A simple example of that could be a photograph taken by drone of a 
sunbathing person when the person has taken precautions to install a 
privacy fence to prevent such photography.  A more sophisticated example 
could be the use of a drone programmed to follow a person, remotely 
sensing that person’s location and activities at various times throughout the 
day, correlating that data with location information, and the subsequent 
selling of that information to commercial entities for marketing purposes.  
Following CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.,16 the tort of trespass 
to land could be used to enjoin the kind of remote sensing that could be 
described as robot paparazzi.  Of course, physically being in public weighs 
against civil privacy rights, but the law recognizes a distinction between 
privacy rights of public figures versus those of ordinary citizens,17 and that 
distinction would appear to apply here as well. 
Finally, the relatively new tort action of invasion of privacy may 
provide a potential cause of action in the context of snooping drones.18  The 
right to privacy arises under the traditional civil tort action of intrusion 
upon seclusion.19  While state court rulings vary under this theory, the tort 
is generally viewed to have originated from a Harvard Law Review article 
authored by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890.  Cognizant that 
technology would develop faster than the law, they foreshadowed the need 
for legal protection from prying eyes: “[N]ow that modern devices afford 
abundant opportunities for the perpetration of such wrongs without any 
participation by the injured party, the protection granted by the law must be 
placed upon a broader foundation.”20  Brandeis and Warren clearly foresaw 
 
15.  Thrifty-Tel, Inc., v. Bezenek, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 473 (Ct. App. 1996). 
16.  962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).  Here the court applied the principles of trespass to 
chattels to support its holding enjoining unsolicited bulk e-mail from being sent.  Id. at 1021. 
17.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281 (1964) (“The public benefit from 
publicity is so great and the chance of injury to private character so small that such discussion 
[regarding public figures] must be privileged.”). 
18.  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ginsberg, 351 F.3d 473, 480 (11th Cir. 2003). 
19.  See id. 
20.  Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 210-21. 
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the potential erosion of personal privacy in the face of technologically 
assisted prying eyes and ears and advocated for the creation of a specific 
right to privacy, constructing their theory from the areas of intentional torts 
against the person, nuisance, and intellectual property.21  From those, the 
argument follows that “the principle which protects personal writings and 
any other productions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right to 
privacy . . . .”22  Legal scholar William Prosser elaborated upon the 
foundations of Brandeis and Warren in a law review article in 196023 where 
he argued that the right to privacy had been legally established in four 
separate but related areas: intrusion, public disclosure, false light, and 
appropriation.  Prosser noted that cases showed these related legal 
principles “have been supported by genuine public demand and lively 
public feeling, and made necessary by real abuses on the part of defendants 
who have brought it all upon themselves.”24  Similar public demand, lively 
debate, and the potential for abuse point towards the continued relevance of 
expanding the privacy torts to remotely sensed private data. 
2. The Third-Party Doctrine Precludes Meaningful Control Over 
Most Remotely Sensed Private Data 
The Third-Party Doctrine is a legal theory relevant to remotely sensed 
private data used by government agencies or police.  While it has not been 
applied to private parties involved in a tort action,25 the doctrine’s 
underpinnings closely parallel the civil right to privacy discussed earlier. 
The Third-Party Doctrine from Smith v. Maryland26 essentially holds that 
individuals who disclose private information to third parties have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that disclosed data.27  Smith is the “pen 
register” case where the Supreme Court held that while the contents of the 
conversation may be protected, the information voluntarily provided to a 
third party, the numbers dialed by the defendant, was not.28  Congress 
responded with the Pen Register Act, which requires a search warrant for 
obtaining evidence via pen register.29 
 
21.  Id. at 213. 
22.  Id. 
23.  William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
24.  Id. at 423. 
25.  The current cases that comprise the “third-party doctrine” all arise from criminal 
matters.   See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 
(1976). 
26.  442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
27.  Id. at 744-45. 
28.  Id. at 774. 
29.  18 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2006). 
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But aside from pen register situations, commentators30 have 
demonstrated that the protections individuals have in their private data is 
quite limited and inconsistent—that “information that has been exposed to 
middlemen, from medical and financial data to our reading habits”31 is 
without Fourth Amendment protection.  In fact, the Court has constructed a 
special category of information described as “transactional” data32—which 
is essentially metadata33—the “outsides” of data packets.  This metadata is 
literally the outside of a physical envelope or the numbers dialed on a phone 
or the GPS coordinates from which protected data is transmitted.  The 
problem is that the metadata is sometimes as rich, or even richer, in content 
than the constitutionally protected data it describes,34 which can be 
incredibly valuable as evidence.  Harvesting metadata is relatively simple; a 
small drone equipped with an appropriately tuned radio frequency scanner35 
can select and record all transmissions within line-of-sight.  And the “sight 
radius” of a small drone operating at a few hundred feet is several orders of 
magnitude larger than a ground-based unit. 
The Sixth Circuit bolstered the Third-Party Doctrine in the context of 
remote sensing by drone in United States v. Skinner.36  In Skinner, the court 
held that warrantless tracking of the defendant by use of his mobile phone 
location data was not unreasonable because he had no “reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the data given off” by his phone.37  That case 
appears to clear the way for metadata harvesting by drone, although various 
federal statutes and regulations may still protect the content of a wirelessly 
transmitted communication. 
 
30.  See, e.g., Jay Stanley, The Crisis in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, AM. CONST. 
SOC’Y (2010), https://www.acslaw.org/files/ACS%20Issue%20Brief%20%20Stanley%204th%20 
Amendment.pdf. 
31.  Id. at 4. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Metadata is data that describes other data, which includes structural information and 
descriptive information.  
34.  An example of rich metadata could be the GPS coordinates from where a series of 
cryptic text messages were sent and received, followed by the GPS location of where the 
transmitting device (and suspect) then traveled. 
35.  An example of such a device is a Cellebrite Universal Forensic Extraction Device, 
which, among other capabilities, can harvest and record data transmissions from cellular devices 
and smartphones. 
36.  690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012). 
37.  Id. at 777. 
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B. FEDERAL STATUTES AND AVIATION REGULATIONS GENERALLY 
PERMIT REMOTE SENSING 
There are a few federal statutes that may potentially regulate remotely 
sensed data by drone, and several existing and proposed Federal Aviation 
Regulations (“FARs”) directly apply to drone operations, but together they 
provide little protection from, control over, or remedy for abuse of remotely 
sensed data by drone.  The relevant federal statutes are the Wiretap Act,38 
the Stored Communications Act,39 and the Pen Register Act,40 which are all 
part of the Electronic Communications Protections Act (“ECPA”).41  The 
applicable FARs include operating rules from 14 CFR 91 and the proposed 
regulations to be numbered 14 CFR 107.42 
1. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act Allows 
Practically Unfettered Data Gathering Via Drone 
While the ECPA generally prohibits the interception and use of the 
contents of electronic communications,43 the potentially evidence-rich 
metadata that describes those communications and is used to identify, sort, 
store, and deliver the communication via the internet has virtually no 
protection.  “Electronic communications means any transfer of signs, 
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature 
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, 
photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign 
commerce . . . .”44  As the discussion of the Third-Party Doctrine above45 
indicates, drones make ideal platforms for remotely sensing data 
transmitted wirelessly, as well as for direct sensing of the ground or 
subjects below via optical camera or otherwise.  Interception of a wirelessly 
transmitted signal would clearly fall under the definition of “electronic 
communications” for the purposes of the ECPA, as would a number of 
other kinds of airborne interceptions.  However, there are four exceptions 
under the ECPA for wire or oral communications, communications made by 
pager devices (tone-only), communications from tracking devices, and 
 
38.  18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006). 
39.  18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006). 
40.  18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2006). 
41.  18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006). 
42.  Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544 
(proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45). 
43.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a)-(e) (2006). 
44.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012). 
45.  See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
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electronic funds transfer information.46  In the drone context, remote 
sensing of location via tracking devices is probably most relevant.  A 
tracking device is defined as “an electronic or mechanical device which 
permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”47  Because 
sensing location information is thusly exempted from protection under the 
ECPA, and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals broadened that notion in 
Skinner to all emanated data, the ECPA itself appears to give very little 
protection to remotely sensed location data or metadata. 
The Wiretap Act,48 part of the ECPA, prohibits governmental 
interception of in-transit communications without a search warrant.  The 
key here is that the communications or data must actually be in transit.49 
But aside from voice calls, most electronic communications and data are 
actually stationary, stored in a server awaiting transmission or another 
server awaiting retrieval by the recipient versus moving along the 
network.50  Thus, it is a very simple thing to avoid violating the Wiretap 
Act; all authorities must do is avoid intercepting communications or data 
while it is moving.  So, while operation of a drone equipped with a packet 
analyzer program51 by a private party or a government actor without a 
search warrant would violate the Wiretap Act, it does nothing to narrow the 
large “emanated data” loophole discussed earlier. 
Finally, the Stored Communications Act52 governs electronic 
communications not in transit—those stored on a computer server.  It was 
enacted to prevent unlawful or unauthorized disclosures of electronic 
communication while in electronic storage by third-party providers.53  
While at first glance this seems to be a restriction on the Third-Party 
Doctrine that protects data from snooping when it is not in transit (which is 
most of the time), it still only protects the “physical contents” of the data, 
not the metadata.  For example, an email’s message would be protected 
when stored on a server, but not the to/from headers, which are considered 
to be “outside the envelope” and thus would fall under the purview of the 
Wiretap Act.  Additionally, there is uncertainty as to the status of old, 
archived communications, such as archived email, which may have less 
 
46.  18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2012). 
47.  18 U.S.C. § 3117(b) (2006). 
48.  18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006). 
49.  Id. 
50.  See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 981-82 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
51.  A packet analyzer is a computer program that can intercept and record data traveling 
through a network.  As data moves through the network, the analyzer can capture a packet, decode 
the packet’s raw data, including metadata, and analyze its content. 
52.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006). 
53.  18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006). 
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protection under the Stored Communication Act.54  For a drone that has 
been assigned a mission to orbit and “listen” for metadata and location 
information being emanated or transmitted wirelessly, none of the parts of 
the ECPA just described would protect that metadata or location 
information. 
2. Current and Proposed Federal Aviation Regulations 
Generally Allow Remote Sensing by Drones 
The FAA currently prohibits the commercial use of small drones 
without special prior authorization,55 but that prohibition has been 
challenged in at least one case56 and is widely viewed as ineffective.57 
Current federal aviation regulations are silent regarding drones or 
unmanned aircraft, but the Agency has recently proposed a new section to 
the federal aviation regulations specific to small drone operations.58  Those 
newly proposed regulations would apply only to commercial operations, 
however, leaving civilian amateur enthusiasts and hobbyists as they 
currently are, which is essentially free to use their small crafts for remote 
sensing so long as they follow the guidelines for amateur model aircraft 
operators,59 and such guidelines are generally limited to avoiding flying 
over crowds of people or otherwise endangering them and avoiding airports 
and aircraft operations.  Those amateur-operator guidelines are silent as to 
whether or not a model aircraft may be equipped with a camera or other 
remote-sensing equipment. 
Governmental entities currently may operate a small drone equipped 
with a remote sensor by way of obtaining a Certificate of Authorization 
(“COA”), which is a regulatory waiver that allows relatively limited, non-
commercial operations.60  More discussion of regulatory and other 
limitations on government use of drones follows later.  However, in both 
 
54.  See generally Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a 
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004).  
55.  FED. AVIATION ADMIN., INTERIM OPERATIONAL APPROVAL GUIDANCE 08-01: 
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS OPERATIONS IN U.S. NAT’L AIRSPACE SYSTEM 4 (Mar. 13, 
2008), available at http://www faa.gov/about/officeorg/headquartersoffices/ato/service 
units/systemops/aaim/organizations/uas/coa/faq/media/uasguidance08-01.pdf. 
56.  See, e.g., Huerta v. Pirker, NTSB Order No. EA-5730, 2014 WL 8095629 (Nov. 18, 
2014). 
57.  Jack Nicas & Andy Pasztor, FAA, Drones Clash on Rules for Unmanned Aircraft, WALL 
ST. J., May 11, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303851804579 
556144292258188. 
58.  Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544 
(proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45). 
59.  FED. AVIATION ADMIN., Advisory Circular 91-57 (June 9, 1981), available at 
http://www faa.gov/documentlibrary/media/advisorycircular/91-57.pdf. 
60.  INTERIM OPERATIONAL APPROVAL GUIDANCE 08-01, supra note 55, at 4. 
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the proposed regulations and in FAA’s policy document “Integration of 
Civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (“UAS”) in the National Airspace 
(“NAS”) Roadmap,”61 the general issue of privacy related to remote sensing 
by drone is raised multiple times, but no enforceable regulatory guidance or 
prohibitions are provided. 
3. The Privacy Act and a Presidential Memorandum Provide 
Some Limitations on Federal Agencies for the Collection, 
Retention, and Dissemination of Remotely Sensed Data 
The Privacy Act of 1974 and a Presidential Memorandum remain the 
last potential legal and policy protections against widespread airborne 
remote sensing of private data.  The Privacy Act62 regulates federal 
governmental agency collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of 
personally identifiable information about individuals63 unless one or more 
of twelve exceptions applies.64  The exceptions appear to render the Privacy 
Act relatively toothless for protecting remotely sensed data.  Two 
significant exceptions that serve as examples in the context of drone remote 
sensing are the exception for law enforcement purposes65 and the exception 
for consumer reporting agencies.66  It appears that data gathered by airborne 
remote sensing would be treated the same way as any other information 
subject to the Privacy Act, regardless of the fact that airborne remote 
sensing facilitates data gathering orders of much greater magnitude than the 
less sophisticated methods in place when the statute was drafted in 1974. 
A Presidential Memorandum titled “Promoting Economic 
Competitiveness While Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil 
Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems”67 was published 
concurrently with the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the proposed 
federal aviation regulations governing the operation of small drones.  A 
Presidential Memorandum is very similar to an executive order, neither of 
which has a basis for existence in the Constitution and both of which are a 
form of executive legislation and have the full force of law if made pursuant 
 
61.  FED. AVIATION ADMIN., INTEGRATION OF CIVIL UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 
(UAS) IN THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE (NAS) ROADMAP (2013), available at http://www.faa.gov/ 
uas/media/uasroadmap2013.pdf. 
62.  5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. 
67.  Presidential Memorandum on Promoting Economic Competitiveness While 
Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft 
Systems (Feb. 15, 2015), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/15/ 
presidential-memorandum-promoting-economic-competitiveness-while-safegua. 
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to a congressional act that delegates some power to the executive.  Here, the 
FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 201268 is the required 
congressional act, which contains a directive to the Secretary of 
Transportation (an executive appointee) to develop a plan to safely integrate 
UAS into the national airspace.69  Therefore, the Memorandum appears to 
be a legally binding instrument that orders federal agencies to take into 
account “privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties”70 concerns related to the 
operations of drones. 
Specifically, the Memorandum establishes guidelines for federal 
agencies in addition to already existing laws, such as the Privacy Act, to 
promulgate policies and procedures for protecting privacy, protecting civil 
rights and civil liberties, accountability, transparency, and reporting.71  For 
protection of privacy, “agencies shall, prior to deployment of new UAS 
technology and at least every 3 years, examine their existing UAS policies 
and procedures relating to the collection, use, retention, and dissemination 
of information obtained by UAS, to ensure that privacy, civil rights, and 
civil liberties are protected.”72  A time limit for retention of collected 
information is set at 180 days, unless longer times are necessary or 
required.73  For protection of civil rights and civil liberties, the 
Memorandum reminds agencies to put in place policies to prohibit violating 
the First Amendment or other parts of the Constitution.74  For 
accountability, the Memorandum requires agencies to establish policies 
addressing audits, subcontractors, oversight, asset sharing, data use and 
sharing, and grant funding matters.75  For transparency, the Memorandum 
requires agencies inform the public about UAS missions, location, and an 
annual summary of operations including a brief description and number of 
operations, but only to the extent such information would not reveal 
compromising law enforcement or security information.76  Finally, each 
agency must provide status reports to the President and public instructions 
for accessing the policies and procedures implemented by the 
Memorandum.77 
 
68.  FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11. 
69.  Id. 
70.  See Presidential Memorandum, supra note 67, at 1. 
71.  Id. at 1-2. 
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. at 2. 
74.  Id. 
75.  Id.  
76.  Id. at 2-3. 
77.  Id. at 3. 
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III. GOVERNMENT VERSUS CIVIL USE OF DRONES 
The use of remote sensing technology by the government or police 
against citizens in the United States has traditionally been limited by the 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.78  Such use by police to 
surveil citizens led to cases questioning the extent to which the government 
could use remote sensing equipment to monitor citizens. The most famous 
of those cases is Katz v. United States,79 where the government used a 
remote sensing device—a microphone—to listen to a private conversation 
occurring in a public telephone booth without a search warrant.80  In 
deciding whether such remote sensing activities were appropriate to use 
against citizens in public places, the Court focused on the overarching 
Constitutional principle that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places”81 and treated the technological surveillance methods as secondary. 
Under Katz, regardless of the location or remote sensing method, private 
data from a conversation is protected from unreasonable search and seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment if it is made with a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.82 
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSTRAINS GOVERNMENTAL 
REMOTE SENSING BY DRONE 
The Fourth Amendment states “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”83  In the context of airborne remote sensing, a number of Supreme 
Court decisions exist that are directly on point.  In those cases, the aircraft 
has been a manned, piloted aircraft, but the distinction is irrelevant for the 
sensing function of the platform. 
 
78.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
79.  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
80.  Id. at 348. 
81.  Id. at 351. 
82.  Id. at 353. 
83.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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1. Airborne Warrantless Remote Sensing from a Legal Altitude Is 
Generally Not a Violation of the Fourth Amendment 
Airborne warrantless searches are generally equivalent to an “open 
fields”84 search and are usually constitutional if they are of an “area in open 
view from any legal altitude . . . as long as the technology used to obtain the 
surveillance is in general public use and does not penetrate into the 
home.”85  That principle is distilled from four Supreme Court decisions. 
Three of those—California v. Ciraolo,86 Florida v. Riley,87 and Dow 
Chemical Co. v. United States88—are pertinent to the “airborne” part.  In 
Ciraolo, police used a small fixed-wing aircraft to observe the defendant’s 
fenced backyard from 1000 feet.89  In Riley, police used a helicopter to 
observe the interior of the defendant’s enclosed greenhouse from a much 
lower altitude.90  In Dow Chemical, an agency used a fixed-wing aircraft to 
photograph the corporation’s secure facility from above.91  In all the cases, 
no search warrant was obtained and the Court found no Fourth Amendment 
violation.  The fourth case sets the bar for the remote sensing part. 
About a decade later, the Supreme Court limited the extent police could 
use sophisticated remote sensing equipment without a search warrant.  In 
Kyllo v. United States, police used a thermal imaging device to infer the 
internal temperature of the defendant’s home by observing the infrared 
signature emitted by the house.92  The Court held that such penetrating 
remote sensing searches are unconstitutional without a search warrant,93 
which appears to limit technological erosion of privacy.  Additionally, the 
Court tied part of its reasoning to the availability of the technology to the 
general public.94 
Although at the time of the decision thermal imaging devices were 
quite expensive and not widely available, they have become relatively 
commonplace now.  A more troubling issue is that thermal remote sensing 
is not a “penetrating” search at all,95 and much more recent cases indicate 
 
84.  Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
85.  Vacek, supra note 3, at 683-84 (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 44 (2001)). 
86.  476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
87.  488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
88.  476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
89.  476 U.S. at 209. 
90.  488 U.S. at 450. 
91.  476 U.S. at 229. 
92.  533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). 
93.  Id. at 40. 
94.  Id. at 34. 
95.  Id. at 40.  The technology at issue in Kyllo had nothing to do with penetration of a home, 
such as the justices perhaps imagined akin to x-ray glasses.  Instead, the remote sensing equipment 
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that any emanations of data—be it thermal, electromagnetic, sound, or 
other—are not protected. 
2. Persistent, Penetrating, or Technologically Sophisticated 
Remote Sensing Probably Requires a Search Warrant 
Airborne warrantless searches are generally held to be equivalent to an 
“open fields” search and are usually constitutional if they are of an “area in 
open view from any legal altitude . . . as long as the technology used to 
obtain the surveillance is in general public use and does not penetrate into 
the home.”96  The original Katz postulation that “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places”97 applied to the United States v. Jones allusions 
to search duration98 and to several notable cases involving searches by 
sophisticated remote sensing technology, and it leads to the argument that 
persistent, penetrating, or technologically sophisticated remote sensing 
probably requires a search warrant. 
In United States v. Jones,99 the Supreme Court decided that “the 
Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use 
of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search’” 
under the Fourth Amendment.100  Much of the opinion focused narrowly on 
the issue of physical trespass to the defendant’s vehicle.101  Although the 
theme of time or search duration appeared no less than seventeen times 
throughout the opinion and concurrences, the Court maintained that its 
holding did not concern whether the search or the duration of the search 
was reasonable because the sole question was binary: whether or not a 
search had occurred.  That left open the question of whether similar “remote 
sensing-type” warrantless searches would be reasonable absent a physical 
trespass.  After the Jones decision in 2012, several cases related to remote 
sensing have been decided that bear on the issue of warrantless remote 
sensing searches. 
 
employed by law enforcement simply sensed a normally invisible part of the electromagnetic 
spectrum—infrared light, which is just slightly “longer” than red light—imperceptible to human 
vision.  Although shorter wavelengths of electromagnetic energy, such as the type used in x-ray 
imaging, actually can penetrate obstructions to vision, the Kyllo case appears to have had the 
physics of electromagnetic imaging exactly backwards. 
96.  Vacek, supra note 3, at 683. 
97.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
98.  132 S.Ct. 945 (2012).  References to search duration or time occurred seventeen times 
throughout the opinion. 
99.  Id. at 949. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. 
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In United States v. Skinner,102 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that warrantless tracking of the defendant by use of his mobile phone 
location data was not unreasonable because he had “no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the data given off” by his phone.103  The duration 
of the data collection was three days, which the court noted was not 
“extreme comprehensive tracking,” unlike the four weeks of tracking in 
Jones.104  Also of note was the court’s reliance on the lack of “physical 
intrusion” in its analysis of whether governmental monitoring of the 
defendant’s broadcast data violated the Fourth Amendment and the court’s 
finding that “[u]sing a more efficient means of discovering [defendant’s 
location] does not amount to a Fourth Amendment violation.”105 
Finally, in Florida v. Jardines,106 the Supreme Court held that the 
warrantless search of defendant’s front porch by use of a drug-sniffing dog 
violated the Fourth Amendment, and a search warrant was required.107 
Throughout the opinion, the Court analogized to remote sensing devices in 
constructing its holding, referring to thermal imaging devices (like those 
used in Kyllo) and high-powered binoculars.108  From these recent cases, it 
appears that the courts are shifting in their analyses of warrantless searching 
from an outdated focus on physical limitations to an approach more 
appropriate to the reality of the age of wireless data and unmanned aircraft. 
Read together, these cases appear to indicate that the longer the 
duration of a surveillance situation (especially via drone), the more 
traditionally “private” the object of surveillance (such as the curtilage or the 
home), and the more technologically invasive the surveillance methods, the 
more likely courts will require a search warrant.  In the long view, it may be 
best to follow Justice Potter’s observation from his concurrence in Katz: the 
Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”109  His wisdom could be 
applied in a data or information context; the Fourth Amendment should 
protect information, not the place where it is found. 
 
102.  690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012). 
103.  Id. at 777. 
104.  Id. at 780. 
105.  Id. at 779. 
106.  133 S.Ct. 1409 (2013). 
107.  Id. at 1417-18. 
108.  Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
109.  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
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B. THERE ARE VIRTUALLY NO CONSTRAINTS ON CIVIL AND 
COMMERCIAL REMOTE SENSING BY DRONE 
Capable, small drones are ubiquitous in the marketplace today, and 
amateur operators and commercial outfits have taken advantage of their 
remote sensing capabilities and low prices, such that small drone activities 
in the United States have literally taken off.110  Such activities include real 
estate aerial photography, surface mine mapping, and videography by 
businesses as large as Nike, BMW, and Wal-Mart.111  While the Fourth 
Amendment, various federal laws, and the Presidential Memorandum 
discussed above limit the federal government and its agencies’ remote-
sensing activities using drones, no such limitations exist for private civilian 
actors or commercial entities using drones for remote sensing.  The FAA 
claims it has authority over all airspace at all altitudes in the United 
States112 and over all aircraft, defined as “any contrivance invented, used, or 
designed to navigate, or fly in, the air.”113  But despite that broad authority, 
non-commercial hobbyists have been historically ignored by FAA in terms 
of following normal aircraft operating rules and regulations as long as they 
avoided manned aircraft and airports.114  And related specifically to remote 
sensing, the FAA has no legislative authority to promulgate—or even 
consider—privacy-related issues. 
1. FAA Generally Ignores Private Hobbyist Use of Drones to 
Conduct Remote Sensing 
Since 1981, the FAA has ignored private operators of model aircraft115 
in terms of operating rules or regulations because model aircraft flight 
posed little risk to other aircraft or people on the ground.  The FAA 
provided non-mandatory guidance to modelers in an advisory document,116 
which generally advised operators to avoid flying over crowds of people or 
otherwise endangering them and to avoid airports and aircraft operations.117 
By complying with those guidelines, model aircraft operators avoided 
 
110.  See, e.g., Jack Nicas, Drone Ban? Corporations Skirt Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 
2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/drone-ban-corporations-skirt-rules-1424373939. 
111.  Id. 
112.  Huerta v. Pirker, NTSB Order No. EA-5730, 2014 WL 8095629 (Nov. 18, 2014). 
113.  49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) (2012). 
114.  See Advisory Circular, supra note 59 (providing safety guidelines, not regulations, for 
model aircraft operators).  
115.  Model aircraft are technologically and aerodynamically identical to modern drones in 
terms of systems, control, and risk to other aircraft and people on the ground. 
116.  See Advisory Circular, supra note 59. 
117.  Id. 
           
482 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:463 
having to comply with the comparatively more complex regulations for 
manned aircraft. 
A similar scheme exists in the proposed regulations for small 
unmanned aircraft in the new FAR part 107.  The new regulations would 
only apply to non-hobby or non-recreational purposes118 per Section 336 of 
the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, which states “the 
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration may not promulgate 
any rule or regulation regarding a model aircraft, or an aircraft being 
developed as a model aircraft”119 as long as it meets several criteria, which 
are essentially the same requirements in the 1981 advisory circular plus a 
maximum weight limit of fifty-five pounds.120  Thus, not only will the FAA 
continue to ignore private hobbyist use of drones as long they do not impact 
safety or interfere with other aircraft, they are prohibited by statute from 
doing so. 
2. The FAA Lacks Jurisdiction over Privacy Issues, Including the 
Collection, Use, and Dissemination of Remotely Sensed Data 
The FAA has no legislative mandate to consider privacy concerns 
when determining aircraft operating regulations.  Instead, the FAA is tasked 
with “assigning and maintaining safety as the highest priority in air 
commerce”121 while considering a number of other economic or efficiency-
type variables.122  None of the other considerations relate to privacy.  
Although the Presidential Memorandum discussed above would include the 
FAA as a federal agency and require the Agency to consider privacy issues 
and promulgate policy and regulations in accordance with the 
Memorandum, the FAA generally is not engaged in use of drones, but 
rather in regulating other persons or entities who are.  Thus, the 
Memorandum directives discussed above do not actually apply to the FAA 
itself, unless the Agency starts using drones.  And if it did, the 
Memorandum only directs internal agency policy and does not grant the 
FAA power nor provide direction as to regulations the Agency might 




118.  Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9544 
(proposed Feb. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 45). 
119.  H.R. Rep. No. 112-381, at 68 (2012). 
120.  Id. at 63. 
121.  49 U.S.C. § 40101(a)(1) (2012). 
122.  49 U.S.C. §§ 40101(a)(2)-(16) (2012). 
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3. The National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (“NTIA”) will Provide Unenforceable 
Guidance to Commercial Entities on Policies for the 
Collection, Use, and Dissemination of Remotely Sensed Data 
Lastly, the Memorandum provides: 
Within 90 days of the date of this memorandum, the Department 
of Commerce, through the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration, and in consultation with other 
interested agencies, will initiate [a] multi-stakeholder engagement 
process to develop a framework regarding privacy, accountability, 
and transparency for commercial and private UAS use.123 
The NTIA is an executive branch agency tasked with advising the 
President on telecommunications and information policy issues.124  Neither 
the Memorandum nor NTIA’s statutory powers provide for any regulatory 
enforcement process. 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE REGULATORY STRUCTURE AND LEGAL 
REMEDIES CONCERNING COLLECTION, USE, AND 
DISSEMINATION OF REMOTELY SENSED PRIVATE DATA 
ARE INSUFFICIENT TO PROTECT REASONABLE 
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY ABSENT COMPREHENSIVE 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
In the context of remote sensing by drone, neither the common law, 
federal law, nor administrative regulation individually or together provide 
comprehensive protection of remotely sensed private data.  The Fourth 
Amendment provides some limited protections in the context of 
government collection of data, but the Third-Party Doctrine significantly 
limits control of remedies for unauthorized use or dissemination of private 
data once it has been obtained by a third party.  And while persistent, 
penetrating, or technologically sophisticated remote sensing by government 
or police is subject to the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment, 
there are no such constraints on civil or commercial remote sensing 
 
123.  See Memorandum, supra note 67, at 3. 
124.  According to its website: 
NTIA is the Executive Branch agency that is principally responsible for advising the 
President on telecommunications and information policy issues. NTIA’s programs and 
policymaking focus largely on expanding broadband Internet access and adoption in 
America, expanding the use of spectrum by all users, and ensuring that the Internet 
remains an engine for continued innovation and economic growth. 
NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. AGENCY, Mission Statement, http://www ntia.doc.gov/?Wz1=VsHx4 
Bg0J6b54d2Z. 
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activities by drone.  A single Presidential Memorandum provides some 
procedural guidance to federal agencies for privacy protection in the context 
of remote sensing by drone and orders the creation of a multi-stakeholder 
framework regarding privacy, accountability, and transparency for 
commercial and private UAS use.  The availability of high resolution digital 
imaging equipment lightweight enough to be mounted on a very small 
drone allows any person to spy on another in ways much more intrusive 
than listening over the backyard fence, and the law simply does not 
adequately contemplate or address the ramifications of that combination.  
Because states are federally preempted from promulgating aviation 
regulations, a comprehensive federal legislative enactment would be the 
most efficient and effective method of limiting both governmental and 
commercial gathering, use, and dissemination of remotely sensed data by 
drone. 
 
